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# FOREIGN POLICY bulletin

AN ANALYSIS OF CURRENT INTERNATIONAL EVENTS

VOLUME 36 NUMBER 21

## What Mr. Khrushchev Wants

by Harrison E. Salisbury

The most interesting characteristic of post-Stalin Soviet foreign policy is its continuity and consistency.

At the time of the East European crisis last autumn it was widely predicted that Moscow would return to the hard line of the Stalin era in both domestic and foreign policy. Considerable evidence to support such a thesis could have been found in the Soviet actions of late 1956 and the early months of 1957. In these months Soviet foreign policy was at best a holding operation and at worst a forced retreat. Most of the gains in goodwill won since Stalin's death were swept away in the tank fire in the streets of Budapest. Moscow was almost completely preoccupied with the complex and difficult task of shoring up Communist Hungary and Poland. Precautionary measures were being taken in Czechoslovakia, Rumania and Bulgaria. There was a notable tightening up at home.

Within the "collective leadership" the balance of forces was subjected to severe stress. Not until East Europe became relatively stable and it was apparent that the West would not utilize Moscow's crisis for the propagation of new tensions was Khrushchev able to re-establish

the pre-eminence of his centrist coalition over the rising "technicians bloc," represented by Pervukhin and, perhaps, Malenkoy. This was accomplished at the plenary session of the Communist party Central Committee in late February. Mr. Khrushchev promptly set in motion an elaborate plan designed, among other things, to strengthen his control over the state industrial apparatus, and then turned once again to foreign policy.

By late March the best-informed diplomatic observers in Moscow were reporting that the Soviet Union was likely to move toward a "new Geneva phase" in foreign policy. Khrushchev and other Soviet leaders who had been boycotting Western social functions in Moscow (and whose parties had been, in turn, boycotted because of the rough language Mr. Khrushchev was using toward the West) began to turn up once again and to offer their vodka glasses in toasts, wreathed with smiles instead of frowns. In no time at all the Soviet diplomatic apparatus was operating almost around the clock, in a torrential volume of notes and declarations, to persuade the Western powers again to take up new diplomatic negotiations.

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While Premier Bulganin's name was affixed to most of the notes, Mr. Khrushchev, characteristically, played a personal role in the diplomatic offensive, receiving groups of journalists from various countries and granting an extensive interview to Turner Catledge, managing editor of *The New York Times*. The television interview which Mr. Khrushchev gave to the Columbia Broadcasting System for presentation over the United States network, thus, was the climax and culmination of an intensive and calculated propaganda drive.

The objective, as correctly forecast by the Moscow diplomats in early spring, is to re-create a semblance of the world atmosphere of the summer of 1955 and to provide an opportunity for new great-power negotiations, leading, as was the case in 1955, in the general direction of a *détente*.

### Need for a *Détente*

This general objective is much more important than the specific content of Mr. Khrushchev's TV interview. Mr. Khrushchev wants negotiations. He is willing to talk disarmament, trade, cultural exchanges, elimination of iron or "wooden" curtains, and the normalization of general relations. He is willing to take a small step or a big step on disarmament. He will not talk unilateral Soviet withdrawal from Eastern Europe, but he will discuss it as part of a big package deal for pulling back troops on both sides.

Of Mr. Khrushchev's eagerness for a *détente* there can be no reasonable doubt. As to the reason for this

eagerness there may be more controversy.

In his TV interview Mr. Khrushchev gave some clues as to the basis of his anxiety. He accepted the thesis that the arms race threatens, at the end, a nuclear war which would be mutually suicidal. While he expressed confidence that "communism" would survive such a war, he made clear that he was alluding to the theory of communism or the Communist body of belief—and not necessarily to the country with which it is currently so closely identified.

He boasted with confidence of Russia's ability to compete effectively with America, both industrially and agriculturally. But behind the big brag lay the ill-concealed facts of obvious economic and agricultural strains, which are magnified as the technological arms race goes into ever more astronomical levels of cost and manpower.

He boasted, equally, of his confidence in communism in East Europe, of the ability of the Kadar regime in Hungary to endure for generations to come. But here, too, his brave words made little more than a shoddy façade for deep and unresolved problems within the Communist world itself. The nature of these intra-Communist problems was underlined by Mr. Khrushchev's own censors who hastily suppressed his incautious declaration that within the Soviet Union there existed none of those "contradictions" between rulers and ruled which Mao Tse-tung has proclaimed are common to all Communist regimes.

Mr. Khrushchev quite obviously has major economic problems at home and deep political problems which involve both Soviet attitudes about the new ideology of Peiping and the old problem of vassal Communist regimes in Budapest, Sofia, Bucharest and elsewhere, not to mention restive Warsaw and fence-sitting Belgrade.

Mr. Khrushchev needs a *détente* for sound reasons of domestic and foreign policy. He needs a success in foreign relations to remove the tainted residue of last autumn's Soviet debacle in Hungary.

### The Effect on the West

These factors are stimulants to the Khrushchev campaign for a *détente*. But underlying them and reinforcing the necessity for a *détente* from the Soviet standpoint undoubtedly is the imbalance in the world military situation, which was bluntly stated by General Lauris Norstad on June 12—the capacity possessed by the United States and its allies to destroy utterly Russia's military potential.

The prime objective of Soviet foreign policy today—as it has been since the time of Stalin's death—is, by all means, to seek to narrow that margin of United States superiority. The present United States-sponsored anti-Soviet military alliance, NATO—with its main strength in Europe—hardly could be expected to persist unweakened if a *détente* were achieved. Even talk of a *détente* causes some political weakening of the alliance.

(Continued on page 168)

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## More Facts Needed on Fallout

"Just fabulous," said Atomic Energy Commissioner Willard F. Libby after the first round of the Holifield committee hearings on the problem of fallout from nuclear weapons tests. Forty-odd witnesses—geneticists, radiologists, biochemists, pathologists and a score of other top-drawer scientists—had just finished two weeks of testimony on this atomic age "black plague."

It is debatable whether they dispelled more ignorance or created more new confusion in these unprecedented hearings. Scientists lectured Senators with chalk and blackboard just like university professors. Each had his own opinion as to the danger, or lack of it, to civilization of strontium-90, the fallout particle which induces cancer and leukemia.

### AEC Point of View

The Atomic Energy Commission itself came in for not a little criticism. Witnesses disputed the AEC's claim that fallout is distributed fairly evenly over the world. They denied its statement that strontium-90 could be "leached" out of the soil by washing with water or injections of calcium. They accused it of making reckless and unsubstantiated statements on the relative harmlessness of test radioactivity. They questioned the wisdom of giving it the dual responsibility of testing weapons and evaluating the hazard from these tests.

Under a little pressure, the AEC spelled out why it thinks weapons tests are necessary despite possible danger. "There is no substitute for testing to determine the reliability of a weapon," said AEC member Willard F. Libby. "Cessation of tests would, to all intents and purposes,

end shortly our developmental work." Thus, the commission's view is that while nuclear tests are dangerous, they are vital to American security. The danger to a few thousand or few hundreds of thousands in mutation of genes, in cancer or leukemia is small in comparison to the danger to the whole race if the United States does not perfect nuclear weapons and warheads to keep ahead of the enemy.

While the hearings left no clear picture of just what the fallout hazard is, they did clear up some fuzzy and fatuous thinking on the subject. For example, no one now suggests that fallout is without danger and that all those who fear it are Cassandras. Nor is anyone, in or out of the AEC, suggesting that there are such things as "clean" nuclear bombs at present. However, whether it is possible to make wholly decontaminated weapons remains unclear.

It quickly developed that no one really knows just where the test saturation point is: at two megatons, ten megatons or forty megatons a year. But all witnesses seemed to agree that it is within that range and may have already been reached. It is clear, therefore, that any nuclear war in which only half a dozen or a dozen nuclear bombs were exchanged would so contaminate the atmosphere and cause such lethal fallout as to threaten human existence.

One reason why witnesses differed so much in their testimony, although talking from the best knowledge they had, was that they were largely talking from ignorance. The fact appears to be that there is not enough information on hand from which to reach reliable conclusions. Fallout that reaches the stratosphere takes

ten years or more to descend to the earth. Then, it may take a generation or more for the effect of the radioactive fallout to show up in the human body. Also our records of fallout are anything but adequate, although much progress on this score has been made in the last year. Incidentally, one of the few positive actions the committee took at these hearings was to order a green light for research into the radioactive effects of strontium-90.

Dr. Ralph Lapp, who is something of a bull-in-the-china-shop science writer and physicist, startled the committee in his dire predictions of the destructions that would accompany a nuclear war by proposing a "sperm bank" or stockpile. He argued this would be the only way of continuing the human race after an atomic war, pointing out that the male reproductive organs are much more sensitive to radiation than those of the female.

### More Hearings Later

As AEC member Mr. Libby said, it was "just fabulous" what these hearings turned up in the way of speculation, proposals, testimony and evidence. At least we now know more about the issues involved. Is it more dangerous to keep on testing than to stop testing? How much radiation is enough? If there is a test saturation point, where is it? The Holifield committee has withdrawn to study the mass of testimony, exhibits and prepared documents collected in these first hearings. After it has digested them the hearings will be reopened not so much to collect facts as to consider American policy on these issues.

NEAL STANFORD





## Should U.S. Trade with Red China?

*(This Forum presents various views on the issue of whether the United States should liberalize its present restrictions on trade with Communist China. The argument against doing so, as well as against diplomatic recognition for the Peiping regime, is represented by excerpts from a statement of the Steering Committee of The Committee of One Million Against the Admission of Communist China to the United Nations. It is only within recent weeks that statements on the other side of this question have appeared. The discussion was touched off, for the most part, by the British action in abandoning its restrictions at the end of May on trade with Communist China in nonstrategic goods. Several of these statements approving trade with Peiping, or in favor at least of a review of the trade ban, are brief and are therefore summarized below. —The Acting Editor)*

**A**MERICAN opposition to Britain's partial lifting of its embargo on trade with Communist China at the end of May was not as critical as would have been expected even a few months ago. Several leading Senators have now made known that they favor a review specifically of the trade issue, and some have proposed liberalizing commercial relations with Peiping and even full-scale trade.

President Eisenhower has likewise opened the door to discussion of trade with Communist China. After the British announcement he said at his press conference on June 5 that in the long run trade could not be

stopped. "You are going to have either just authorized trade," he added, "or you are going to have clandestine trade." While insisting that present trade restrictions would be enforced so long as they were the law, he also stated: "But whether or not it should be—whether we should eliminate this differential, frankly, I don't see as much advantage in maintaining the differential as some people do, although I have never advocated its complete elimination." The President was speaking here of the differential which the Western powers have maintained between their trade with Communist China and their trade with the Soviet Union.

### Senators Speak Out

Among the Senators who have recently voiced opinions on the trade problem, Senator George A. Smathers (D) of Florida has been most direct in calling for trade with Peiping. Another Senator from the South, Senator Allen J. Ellender (D) of Louisiana has also said that the United States should consider lifting its total restrictions on trade between this country and Communist China. In a radio interview from Washington on June 2 he said that if European countries were going to expand such trade, "it strikes me we might look into the feasibility of selling some of our nonstrategic materials" to Peiping. The leader of the Senate, Lyndon B. Johnson (D) of Texas, likewise favors a new look at America's position on this question. On June 1 he said we "must frankly face the fact that the British action will require us to re-evaluate the Chinese

### Statements in Favor

Following are summaries of brief statements on the issue of freeing trade with Communist China, by various leading members of the Senate. President Eisenhower's recent comment on the issue is also noted.

trade situation." Senator Ellender also indicated he would not be adverse to Japan stepping up its trade with the Chinese mainland. From such a comment it is clear, in part, that problems involving world textile markets, always of importance to southern states, are present in the minds of some Senators who now favor a review of the trade issue.

The question of diplomatic recognition of Peiping has entered only indirectly into the present discussions on trade, although Senator J. William Fulbright (D) of Arkansas said on June 16 in a television interview that recognition was inevitable. "The only question is when and how you do it." More specifically on commercial relations with Peiping, he suggested that trade between Communist China and the United States, including air routes, could be included in negotiations over diplomatic recognition. He proposed also that Peiping guarantee the independence of Formosa (Nationalist China). Senator Warren G. Magnuson (D) of Washington has also referred recently to opening air services with the China mainland. He proposed on June 17, as a first step in decreasing trade restrictions, that American air lines be allowed to carry passengers and mail to Communist China. "I know the Administration's policy is against such trade," he said. "But we have got to be realistic. The rest of the world is going to trade with China. . . . We certainly would not be building up China's war potential by permitting the air lines to fly passengers and mail there. We ought to

*(Continued on page 166)*

## Statement Against

The following is an excerpt from a statement of the Steering Committee of The Committee of One Million Against the Admission of Communist China to the United Nations, reprinted by permission.

**T**HE PAST few months have seen the rise of a concerted effort to convince the American people of the desirability of closer economic and diplomatic relations with Communist China. . . . The campaign seems to be based primarily on two assumptions:

(a) The Communists are in firm and permanent control of mainland China. Even though we do not like the Peiping regime, it is in power and will be there for a very long time to come. There is nothing that we, or the Free Chinese on Taiwan, can do to change this situation. Therefore, rather than ignore 600 million people, we must deal with the Peiping regime.

(b) Chinese Communism is somehow different from that promoted by the Kremlin. Expanded trade and cultural relations between the free world and Communist China will drive a wedge between the Kremlin and Peiping and perhaps even make a Tito out of Mao Tse-tung. Through such trade and cultural relations, ties between Red China and the free world will be strengthened, with the corresponding weakening of the ties between Peiping and the Kremlin.

The Committee of One Million, which has been in the forefront of the fight for international decency and the security of our nation by opposing the admission of Communist China to the United Nations or its recognition by our government, believes that these two assumptions are completely false. They are similar to those basic and false premises which were used during the 1930's to justify the democracies' relations with Japan,

Italy and Germany. . . .

There are still governments in the free world which believe that one can safely do business with tyranny; that it is possible for freedom to exist side by side with slavery; that somehow we can weaken the forces that threaten our freedom by strengthening them economically and diplomatically. . . .

The Committee of One Million believes that any closer ties with Red China could only help to bolster and give prestige to a regime which is the avowed enemy not only of our country and our allies but of the free world. We are convinced that it would be of utmost danger to help this aggressive power in any way, shape or form. By its very actions Communist China has proved itself to be an outlaw nation.

### Red China Tyranny

On mainland China the Peiping regime is guilty of brutal and inhuman repression against its own people. In a recent official report, made by Secretary General Hammarskjöld to the 21st session of the United Nations Economic and Social Council, documented facts were cited. The figures showed that the Peiping regime had literally enslaved 25 million Chinese—perhaps the greatest slave labor force in modern times, exceeding that even in the Soviet Union. According to the UN report, the Peiping regime not only presses its subjects into slavery in their own country but exports slaves to European Communist countries as payment for weapons and ammunition. The report estimates that 1.5 million

Chinese have been shipped to Eastern Europe to work as slaves. In addition to the physical enslavement of the Chinese people, the Chinese Communists have murdered over 20 million of their people. This figure, which seems incredible, was arrived at from *official* Chinese Communist reports published over the past seven years and collected by free-world sources.

In international affairs the Chinese Communists have practiced deceit and aggression. The Peiping regime has refused to make peace in Korea (which still makes Red China technically at war with the UN) and has violated the Korean truce time and again. It is building up its air and man power in North Korea in direct violation of the truce agreement. In addition to torturing, brain-washing and murdering captured troops, many of these Americans, the Chinese Communists to this day have not accounted for hundreds of young Americans and other allied troops captured during the Korean war. Reports filtering through from the slave labor camps of China and Siberia indicate that there are many young Americans suffering under Communist slavery. The Chinese Communists directly participated in arming and advising the Viet Minh in North Vietnam and, after the 1954 accord signed in Geneva, broke their pledge not to enlarge Communist forces in the North. They have also dishonored their pledge to allow all those who wish to do so to freely leave the Communist North for South Vietnam.

Communist China is now openly and officially fostering the international drug traffic, which is used as a weapon to weaken the free world and to finance subversive international Communist activities in all the nations of the world. The UN Commission on Narcotic Drugs has a

complete dossier of facts proving that the international drug traffic is directed by the highest government sources in Peiping. The Peiping regime has invaded and conquered Tibet and is openly encouraging subversive movements in Malaya and Southeast Asia. It continues to actively threaten Formosa and, in discussions at Geneva and since, has specifically refused to renounce the use of force in the Formosa area. . . .

### Opposition to Trade

Instead of driving a wedge between Peiping and Moscow, expanded trade would only solidify their unity. It would ease the drain on the resources of the U.S.S.R. which are being turned over to Peiping to build their war machine, and help to bolster the desperately sagging economy of Communist China.

The moment trade restrictions are eased substantially, the prestige of the Peiping regime will begin to mount in Asia.

The economy of Red China, which by its own admission is facing serious difficulties, will be bolstered. In a recent speech the deputy minister of economic planning of the Peiping regime called for wide-scale economic retrenchments and admitted serious failures: critical shortages of the means of production, specifically pig iron, steel and lumber; shortages in meats, totaling 20 million hogs; shortages in edible oils; shortages in cotton, totaling 20 million tons; shortages in coal, which led to the destruction of railroad cars for fuel in Inner Mongolia. These are but a few of the figures cited which indicate the severe economic crisis faced by Red China. Expansion of trade would act as a rescue operation.

The power of Peiping will be considerably enhanced, both over its own people and in its ability to take aggressive action against its neighbors.

American newspapermen and businessmen will go into Red China and begin dealing with Communist government officials.

In order to wade through the bureaucratic red tape inherent in any Communist society, pressures will increase for American government officials to be stationed in Red China to assist our citizens.

The next step will be establishment of official American consular offices.

Vera Micheles Dean, editor of the Foreign Policy Association's publications, left on June 10, via Japan and Southeast Asia, for India, where she will occupy the chair of American Civilization and Social Institutions at the School of Graduate Studies of the University of New Delhi during the summer semester. During her absence Grant S. McClellan, former FPA research associate, will act as editor. Mr. McClellan has also served with the State Department in the Office of Intelligence Research, and has worked with the Council on Foreign Relations and the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

Inevitably, the next step will be recognition of Peiping.

Somewhere along the line, in the succession of capitulations by the United States, will come admission of Communist China to the UN.

### Statements in Favor

*(Continued from page 164)*

loosen up some of the restrictions so Americans could travel there. We also ought to consider the possibility of an exchange by which American newsmen could be stationed in China on a regular basis."

Other Senators who have spoken out in favor of reconsidering the Red China trade embargo have been Senator Edward J. Thye (R) of Minnesota, a staunch supporter of President Eisenhower, and Senator Hubert H. Humphrey (D) also of Minnesota. The latter has indicated that if we are ready to talk seriously about disarmament with the Communists, why not talk trade seriously, too? Humphrey said in a television interview on June 2, however, that he would not favor recognition of Red China until it makes "amends" to the United Nations, which has branded it an aggressor in Korea.

### Study of the Trade Issue

Through all of these various statements appears the theme of favoring trade relaxation without heading into the problem of recognition for Peiping, a point vigorously attacked in the accompanying argument by the Committee of One Million. However, before that issue is joined, if it is at all in the near future, it is not yet clear how the trade issue itself will be resolved. The President's statement above that the law now restricts all trade has been questioned. Senator Fulbright, among others, has challenged this position, indicating that the President has discretionary power to relax trade restrictions, at least over nonstrategic goods. Relaxation of the trade embargo may turn eventually then on interpretation of the various laws now regulating trade with Communist China. The issues, however, of whether that trade should be freed, and if so to what extent, must be settled first. Senator Magnuson, chairman of the Senate's Interstate and Foreign Commerce Committee, has announced that these questions, as well as others, will be considered by a new subcommittee of his group scheduled to begin hearings on July 9.

## Israel on the Move

JERUSALEM, ISRAEL—A new feeling of confidence is surging through this young nation of Israel. Nothing can dim its jubilation over the Sinai victory, not even the politically enforced withdrawal, bitter as that was.

The exuberance with which Israel celebrated its ninth Independence Day in May was in marked contrast to other years. Diplomats in the country commented on it. There was almost a Mardi gras spirit, they felt, as compared to the undercurrent of tension in the past. All of the Soviet bloc diplomats, save those from Hungary and Poland, boycotted the parade, with its featured display of captured Russian equipment. Israel exulted in the slight.

Today the nation breathes more freely, has a greater sense of security. The feeling akin to despair that gripped the country prior to the Sinai campaign has gone. Then Israel was watching an ominous star rising over the Arab world, the star of Colonel Nasser. It saw the armies of Syria, Jordan and Egypt united under one command—an Egyptian command—and shuddered. *Fedayeen* raids were a constant harassment. The boycott of Israeli shipping in the Suez and through the Strait of Tiran was tightening the economic noose about the country. Israel felt itself without friends, almost helpless in the closing pincers of a hostile Arab world.

Now, as a result of the Sinai campaign and the sequence of events in the Middle East which followed, Israel has taken new courage. It feels it has achieved a stronger position in the world. It believes that other nations are more conscious of Israel and its problems, and understand them better. Today, with the United

Nations Emergency Force at Sharm el Sheikh, the Gulf of Aqaba is open to shipping. The port of Elath is a frontier boom town.

Almost overnight, as it were, the political situation has changed. The Arab nations are still united in hostility to the state of Israel and resent its existence; but they are no longer united among themselves, nor are they under Egypt's Nasser. The three Arab Kings—King Saud of Saudi Arabia, King Faisal of Iraq, and King Hussein of Jordan—have risen to defend their thrones against the Communist menace. The Middle East is a divided camp.

### Facing Problems

Israel has taken new heart at the United States' challenge of Soviet encroachment. Not that the Russians are on the run; far from it. But Moscow miscalculated in betting on Egypt's "strong man," and it suffered a defeat in Jordan. Israel is elated, but it is well aware that the Soviet purpose—to keep the Middle East in a state of ferment—has not changed. The Russians have simply shifted their scene of operations.

Today it is Syria which is receiving quantities of Russian arms. Today it is Syria, instead of Egypt, to which the technical "experts" and agitators are gravitating. Syria may be weak as a nation. It may have no forceful figure like Colonel Nasser at the helm, but it is in a pivotal spot geographically in the Arab world.

Israel knows that it lives dangerously. Even so, it plans for the future realistically. Israelis cannot afford to worry about tomorrow; there is too much to be done today. They are forging ahead with ambitious plans

for development of the port of Elath. If the port remains open, if railways and highways are built to connect it with the Mediterranean port of Haifa, Israel has a bright economic future.

Yet nothing is sure in the shifting political sands of the Middle East. Israel knows that as long as the contentious problems of that part of the world remain—the question of Arab refugees, disputed boundaries, Israel's right to freedom of waterways—there can be no security.

As for sending a test ship through the Suez Canal, Israel does not wish to risk the censure of public opinion by forcing this issue at an inopportune time. Israelis are unyielding in their claim to the right to use the canal. But in the interests of peace, and as a concession to the United States, they may consent to shipment of Israeli goods in foreign ships rather than in vessels flying the Israeli flag.

Given a choice between navigation in the canal or the Gulf of Aqaba, Israel would insist upon its right to "innocent passage" in both. Of the two, the gulf could be the more important, in the long run. It could open the way for a profitable trade between Israel and Asia. It could—with an oil pipeline from Elath to Haifa—provide an alternative or a supplement to the Suez.

As for the argument that the Arabs hold a trump card in oil, Israeli officials say, "Yes, the Arab nations have the oil, it is true, but they are dependent upon the West for customers. Look how quickly, after the closing of the canal, King Saud went rushing to the United States for aid."

The Israelis are finally ready to sit



down with the Arabs and discuss the refugee problem. Yet the Arabs will not meet with Israeli officials and refuse even to recognize the existence of the state of Israel. There is technical agreement on the scheme to harness the waters of the Jordan River in a joint irrigation plan, but adjoining Arab nations refuse to go forward with it. They threaten Israel if it proceeds alone with its part of the scheme. "We will go ahead when the time comes," Israelis mutter grimly. For they need the waters of the Jordan for development of the Negev, and they must irrigate the Negev if they are to support a growing immigrant population.

### Attitudes Toward the West

Sizing up its allies, Israel feels complete trust in only one—France. In France it sees another nation with the common problem of "Nasser imperialism." Israel feels that France is facing up to that problem realistically; that it sees nothing to be gained by trying to appease the Arabs. Israelis have little or no confidence in Britain. There is great bitterness over Britain's policy of appeasement in the Middle East. Israel is convinced that this policy led directly to the British loss of influence in the Arab world. Israelis still mistrust the British. Some officials go so far as to say they would not be surprised to

see Britain resume supplying arms to Egypt one of these days.

Resentment at United States' threats of sanctions against Israel has largely subsided. Most Israelis are prone to think of this in the terms of a "family quarrel." Now that it is passed, there is a tendency to let bygones be bygones.

There is confidence in Washington's stand for a free and independent Israel, even if it is sometimes but feebly implemented. Israelis feel drawn to the United States by many ties, but they are frankly baffled as to exactly what its policy in the Middle East really is, where that policy is headed; what it expects to accomplish, and what it aims for in the way of solving basic problems.

The Eisenhower Doctrine so far has tackled none of the issues mentioned above. Israelis wonder if Washington's policy is to preserve the *status quo*—to keep things quiet at all costs rather than to resolve the basic issues which make for Middle East tension. As long as these issues remain, there will be no real security for Israel. What does the United States propose to do about them? Israel wishes it knew.

JOSEPHINE RIPLEY

Miss Ripley has been with *The Christian Science Monitor* since 1931 and a member of its Washington News Bureau since 1945. She has just returned from an assignment in Israel.

## Salisbury

(Continued from page 162)

That is the basic political fact which lies behind the present Soviet diplomatic and propaganda campaign, in which Mr. Khrushchev is playing the principal role.

Mr. Salisbury, Moscow correspondent of *The New York Times* for six years, 1949-1954, has long specialized in the foreign news field and first visited Moscow in 1944. Now on the New York staff of *The New York Times*, he is the author of *American in Russia* (New York, Harper, 1955), and one of the authors of FPA's *Headline Series* No. 115, "Great Decisions: The U.S. Looks Ahead," January 1956.

## FPA Bookshelf

*Italy*, by Gerardo Zampaglione. Nations of the Modern World Series. New York, Praeger, 1956. \$6.50.

A history of modern Italy from 1815 to the present by a former journalist and teacher of political science at the University of Rome who is now a member of the Italian diplomatic service. Included are special chapters on Italy's foreign policy since 1943, its efforts on behalf of European unity, land reform, and other present-day problems, such as overpopulation and underproduction.

*The Soviet System of Government*, by John N. Hazard. Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1957. \$4.00.

An excellent brief study of the structure and operation of the Soviet government, by a member of the Columbia University faculty who teaches in Columbia's Russian Institute. Professor Hazard describes the Soviet system as "incorporating democratic forces, counterweighted with totalitarian controls." He does not believe that "Stalin's heirs intend to institute a democratic system of government."

## FOREIGN POLICY BULLETIN

345 East 46th Street, New York 17, N. Y.

### In this issue:

What Mr. Khrushchev Wants—	
H. E. Salisbury .....	161
More Facts Needed on Fallout—	
N. Stanford .....	163
Should U.S. Trade with Red China?—	
Statements in Favor .....	164
Statement Against .....	165
Israel on the Move—	
J. Ripley .....	167

### In the next issue:

A Foreign Policy Report—	
Current Trends in Poland,	
by John Michael Montias	

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